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DETERMINING A "FINAL ACTION" OF THE EPA FOR
PURPOSES OF EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: DOES A
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE QUALIFY?
Virginia v. United States'
by Rachel Craig
I. INTRODUCTON
Increased levels of ozone in
the lower atmosphere can cause health
problems and financial problems
through harm to food and crops. The
Clean Air Act' (CAA) authorizes the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to set forth National Ambient Air
Quality Standards' (NAAQS) to combat
the increased ozone levels. A
nonattainment area is an area that fails
to meet the minimum level of air quality
promulgated by NAAQS.4 There are
various classifications of nonattainment
areas, beginning with marginal and
ending with severe.s Depending on the
level of nonattainment classification for
an area, states are required to implement
various plans to do their part in cleaning
up the nation's air.6 Title I of the Clean
Air Act requires a state with
nonattainment areas of moderate,
serious or severe to create a state
implementation plan (SIP) to reduce
Volatile Organic Compound (VOC)
emissions in these areas by fifteen
percent no later than three years after
the date of the enactment of the CAA
Amendments of 1990.1 VOCs are
pollutants that contain carbon and exist
in a gaseous state at room temperature.'
In the presence of sunlight and heat,
these gases react with nitrogen oxides
and create ozone.' Exhaust from
automobiles and stationary sources like
factories increase the level of nitrogen
oxides in the atmosphere, thus
increasing ozone levels. 0
As a result of the declining air
quality in the various states, in 1990,
Congress amended the CAA in order to
increase state participation in
decontaminating the air." These
amendments extended deadlines for
states to reach attainment levels
satisfactory to NAAQS and imposed
new deadlines for states to reduce ozone
levels." In addition, the 1990
amendments implemented a permit
program designed to improve air quality
in stationary sources such as factories
and power plants."
The failure of a state to create
an SIP could result in sanctions under
Title I of the CAA."4 The statute
authorizes the EPA to impose sanctions
that would prevent states from spending
highway funds in areas that did not meet
the NAAQS attainment levels.' If the
state proposes an SIP the EPA does not
approve it, the state is required to
produce an adequate SIP within the next
24 months or face mandatory withdrawal
of highway funds.'" The statute,
however, allows the EPA to block
highway funding prior to the two-year
period provided the proper notice and
comment proceedings have been
followed." For failing to propose a valid
SIP, the EPA also may require more
stringent permit criteria for private
industry.'" This is mandatory if an
adequate revision to the previously
proposed SIP has not been submitted
within 18 months. 9 If a state does not
propose an adequate SIP after two years
from the EPA's rejection, the EPA must
create a federal implementation program
(FIP) in areas where there is still
nonattainment. 20
In addition to the SIP, Title V
of the CAA also requires the states to
174 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 1996).
242 U.S.C. Sections 7401 et. seq. (1989 and Supp. 1 1996).
342 U.S.C. Sections 7408-7409. (1989 and Supp. 11996).
Id.
542 U.S.C. Section 7511(a). (Supp. 1 1996). The relevant classifications codified in this section are: marginal, moderate, serious, and
severe.
'42 U.S.C. Sections 7511-7511 f. (Supp. 1 1996).
742 U.S.C. Sections 7511 a(b)(1 )(A)(i), 7511 a(c) & 7511 a(d). (Supp. 11996).
"Virginia, 74 F.3d at 520.
91d.
"'Id. at 521. Ozone is detrimental in high concentrations in lower atmosphere or in our "breathable" air. It can cause major health problems
like chest pains, coughing, nausea, throat irritation, increased susceptibility to respiratory infections, food and crop damage. As a caveat,
in the upper atmosphere, ozone prevenis cancer caused by intense exposure to the sun's ultraviolet radiation.
"lid. at 520.
1242 U.S.C. Sections 7511-7511 f. (Supp. 1 1996).
'142 U.S.C. Sections 7661-7661f. (Supp. 1 1996),
"42 U.S.C. Sections 7410(m), 7506(c) & 7509(b)(1) (Supp. I. 1996).
"Id.
42 U.S.C. Section 7509(b)(1) (Supp. I. 1996).
1742 U.S.C. Section 7410(m) (Supp. 1. 1996).
'42 U.S.C. Section 7509(b)(2) (Supp. 1. 1996).
"42 U.S.C. Section 7410(m) (Supp. 1. 1996).




designed to regulate stationary sources
of air pollution.2' The EPA can approve
this program only if it provides:
an opportunity for judicial
review in State court of the
final permit action by the
applicant, any person who
participated in the public
participation process... and
any other person who could
obtain judicial review of such
[decisions] under State laws.22
If the EPA rejects the state's Title V
program, the state must correct the
problem within 18 months or face
sanctions as provided above."
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In the instant case, the
Northern Virginia area was in serious
nonattainment and was thus subject to
Title I and Title V of the CAA.24 Virginia
failed to implement a proper SIP within
the specified time period because it had
submitted only draft regulations of the
plan instead of final regulations." In
addition, Virginia's plan under Title V of
the CAA failed to fulfill the requirements
of proper judicial review because the
statute only allowed those who could
prove a pecuniary and substantial
interest to have standing to bring a suit
for review.26 The EPA took final action,
stating that Virginia's program was
incomplete."
Pursuant to pending sanctions
by the EPA, Virginia brought an action
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, claiming that the Title
I and Title V provisions of the CAA
violated the spending clause2" and the
guarantee clause29 as well as the Tenth
Amendment of the United States
Constitution." Virginia argued that by
requiring the ozone attainment
programs, the federal government
violated the Tenth Amendment by
"commandeer[ing] the processes of
Virginia's legislature and courts" in
addition to violating the Constitution's
guarantee of a republican form of
government." Virginia further argued
that the highway fund sanction for
failure to implement specified air quality
programs was not "rationally related"
to the proper objective of federal
highway funding and is "impermissible
coercion" that violates the limitations
impliedly imposed by Congress under
the Spending Clause of the
Constitution.32 The court dismissed the
complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because the Clean Air Act
states:




any other final action of the
Administrator under this
chapter.. .which is locally or
regionally applicable may be
filed only in the United States
Court of Appeals for the
Appropriate Circuit.3
The court found that a constitutional
challenge to the statute was in effect an
appeal of a final EPA action and
therefore under the previous section of
the CAA, the district court had no
subject matter jurisdiction." On appeal
in the instant case, Virginia argued that
the statute was unconstitutional was
not an appeal of a final action, but was a
federal question brought to the court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331."
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision that though plead as a
constitutional claim, Virginia's case was
essentially an appeal of a final order by
the EPA and was thus outside the
jurisdiction of the federal district
courts.36
IIILEGALBACKGROUND
The issue presented in
Virginia v. United States was whether a
constitutional challenge to the 1990
amendments to the Clean Air Act was
sufficient to establish an appeal of a final
decision by the EPA, invoking
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal
courts of appeals." The United States
has established exclusive jurisdiction of
final actions by the EPA in federal courts
of appeals in order to promote various
policies behind the CAA." Some courts
have not construed a constitutional
challenge to environmental statutes
2142 U.S.C Sections 7661-7661(f) (Supp. I. 1996).






"U.S. Const. Art. I, Section 8, cl. I.
29U.S. Const. Art. V, Section 4.
WVirginia. 74 F3d at 521-22.
"Id. at 522.
32Id.
"42 U.S.C. Section 7607(b)(1) (Supp. 1. 1996).




3x42 U.S.C. Section 7607(b)(1) (Supp. 1. 1996).
39Virginia, 74 E3d at 526.
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themselves to be equivalent to a final
action by the EPA.' In cases where the
courts treat constitutional challenges as
separate from final EPA actions, the
district courts do have federal question
jurisdiction.4 1
A. History of the Ambient Air Quality
Provisions of the Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act was
enacted to "protect and enhance the
quality of the Nation's air resources."42
The CAA was amended in 1977 to
require the establishment of ajoint effort
between the EPA and the individual
states wherein the EPA sets out the
national uniform air quality
requirements and the states create State
Implementation Plans which meet the
EPA's standard. 43 The CAA requires
states to be responsible for meeting the
appropriate air quality levels within a
deadline established by Congress. 44
The standards set by the EPA must
"protect the public health with an
adequate margin of safety, without
regard to the economic or technical
feasibility of attainment." 45 The states
are required to develop implementation
programs which estimate emission
levels in the air." In response to the
emission levels, the states must
determine whether or not control
programs should be implemented in
order to achieve satisfactory emission
levels established by the EPA.47
As a practical matter, the 1977
amendments to the Clean Air Act did
little to reduce ozone pollution, carbon
monoxide pollution, and small
particulate matter pollution.' There
were various reasons for the failure of
these amendments to achieve the
desired attainment level.' For instance,
mobile source emissions were not
reduced to the extent desired because
transportation control measures like gas
rationing, restricted parking, and
restricted freeway lanes were strongly
resisted and eventually prohibited by
Congress." In addition, very few
controls were required on stationary
source categories.s' In 1977, the
deadline was extended to 1982 for
achieving the appropriate levels of
ozone and carbon monoxide, with
options for additional extensions into
1987.52 Various areas which failed to
achieve attainment in 1982 automatically
received an extension to 1987.11 When
areas failed to meet the 1987 deadline
for attainment, the EPA attempted to
initiate a construction ban sanction on
those not in compliance.54 Only a few
of those sanctions were implemented."
By 1988, the list of areas in violation of
the ozone standard had grown from 70
cities in 1987 to 101 cities in 1988."
In response to the growing
number of areas with non-complying
ozone levels, the House Committee in
charge of this problem requested a
report by the General Accounting Office
(GAO) regarding the deficiency of the
current program." The report, entitled
"Ozone Attainment Requires Long-Term
Solutions to Solve Complex Problems",
revealed various inadequacies of the
attainment program in effect at the time.
In some cases, if attainment measures
were implemented, they were often not
enforced." The report also revealed that
the ozone reduction plans may not have
been realistic due to an understatement
of hydrocarbon emission inventories
because of incorrect data, deficient
models, and uncertainties in tools and
models used in calculating in the
inventories.' The GAO also found that
other factors such as scientific
uncertainties, weather patterns,
inventory sources and modeling, in
addition to the magnitude of the
"0See Missouri v. United States, 918 F.Supp. 1320 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Pacific Legal Foundation v. Costle, 627 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1980).
'28 U.S.C. Section 1331 (1986).
"H.R. Rep. No. 101-490(I), 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990).
4 31d. The standard is the maximum allowable concentration of each of the six criteria pollutants: lead, particulate matter, nitrogen dioxide,





















problem, may have contributed to the
unachievable deadlines.6 ' The GAO
concluded that the problem could not
be resolved with a single solution, but
should have been addressed with a
number of solutions. 62 Specifically, the
GAO suggested that Congress should
amend the CAA and establish a strategy
that differentiates among the severity
of ozone in different non-attainment
areas and establishes different
attainment deadlines accordingly.6 1 In
addition, Congress should revise the
Act's sanctions and provide a clear
policy regarding when the sanctions will
be activated.6 4 Correspondingly,
Congress amended the CAA in 1990,
including in Title I and Title V of the
amendments a new standard for
attaining the appropriate air levels of
ozone, carbon monoxide pollution, and
particulate matter pollution.'
B. Avoiding Repetitive and Attenuated
Review
In order to promote the policy
behind the Clean Air Act, Congress
established exclusive jurisdiction of final
actions by the EPA to be in the federal
courts of appeal. 6' The policy
underlying this provision in the CAA is
to provide "prompt and conclusive
review of air quality controversies."
Various courts note the desire to avoid
duplicative review of final actions by
administrative agencies such as the
EPA.6" In Palumbo v. Waste
Technologies Industries, the court held
that federal courts of appeal had
jurisdiction over a claim that challenged
the validity of permits for hazardous
waste incinerators under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act6 9
which has an exclusive jurisdiction
scheme similar to that under the CAA."
The court stated that Congress enacted
such a provision in order to avoid
"duplicative review and the attendant
delay and expense involved."" The
court also stated that "adding another
layer of collateral review" could threaten
the administrative process that
Congress has established.72 The court
indicated that if a plaintiff were able to
sue in a federal district court as well as a
federal circuit court, the plaintiff could
choose to sue in the district court which
has a different standard of review under
the Administrative Procedure Act 3 .
According to the Court's rationale, the
plaintiffs, by choosing to file their claim
in a federal district court, also would be
able to circumvent the time period for
filing an appeal, which would not need
be done in a district court case because
so long as there is a legitimate case or
controversy, the plaintiff has the
discretion when and whether to bring
its claim. 74
Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Reilly" also promoted
expeditious review of EPA decisions by
holding that under the Clean Air Act,
an action seeking to force the EPA to
initiate standards requiring vehicles to
be equipped with refueling vapor
recovery systems is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the circuit courts.76 The
district court in which the suit was
brought held that it did not have
jurisdiction after evaluating two basic
policy reasons behind the jurisdictional
provision of the CAA.77  The court
stated that if no further facts were to be
found, the proper information was
available to the appeals court via the
underlying administrative record,
making an action in the district court
just an unnecessary layer in the review
process.7 1 The second policy reason
propounded by Natural Resources is
the risk of cumulative or duplicative
litigation.7 9 The court indicated that
allowing a plaintiff to a review of a final
decision by the EPA in both a district
court and a circuit court would allow for
inconsistent judgments and
confusion."' For these policy reasons,
the courts have upheld the provision in
the CAA which requires federal circuit
court review of final EPA actions.







'42 U.S.C. Section 7607(b)(1) (Supp. I. 1996).
'Virginia, 74 E3d at 526.
"See Palumbo v. Waste Technologies Industries, 989 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1993); General Electric Uranium Management Corp. v. U.S., 764
F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Reilly, 788 F.Supp. 268 (E.D. Va. 1992).
'42 U.S.C. Section 6901 et.seq. (1994).
"Palumbo, 989 F.2d at 151 (4th Cir. 1993).
"Id. at 162 (quoting General Electric Uranium Management Corp. v. U.S. Department of Energy, 764 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).7 1d. at 161.
73Id.
7 1d.








Recovery Authority v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency",
the court listed additional policy
reasons for making review of final EPA
decisions exclusive in the federal courts
of appeal. The court stated that
appellate courts are better suited to
review a final EPA decision because
they tend to develop a general expertise
regarding the agencies to which they
are assigned exclusive jurisdiction.82 In
addition, the Greater Detroit court
reiterated the aforementioned policy
reasons such as the risk of cumulative
or duplicative judgments."
One case held that the policy
reasons behind the CAA would best be
achieved by granting jurisdiction of
final EPA decisions to the federal courts
of appeal even in situations where
jurisdiction is ambiguous.84 General
Electric Management Corp. v. U.S.
asserted that in a situation where
jurisdiction is unclear, the default rule
should be that jurisdiction goes to the
federal courts of appeal.15 The court
stated the general proposition that
"where it is unclear whether review
jurisdiction is in the district or the circuit
court of appeals the ambiguity is
resolved in favor of the latter"." The
court explains that the policy for this
rule is to expedite the review process
by allowing the complaint to be
reviewed only by the federal court of
appeal instead of allowing the case to
be brought in the district court which
would allow further review in the courts
of appeal. 7 In the General Electric
case, General Electric brought suit in a
federal district court challenging a fee
established by the Department of
Energy.' The suit was dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction."
General Electric appealed and the court
of appeals held that jurisdiction was
ambiguous so the court should look to
the most efficient way of resolving the
dispute.' In such a situation, the Court
said jurisdiction should be given to the
circuit courts."
C. Determining a "Final Action" Under
the Clean Air Act
Though most courts agree that
exclusive jurisdiction of final EPA
actions in the courts of appeal helps to
promote expeditious and equitable
determinations of controversies, these
courts have taken a narrow view of what
constitutes a "final action" by the EPA.'
Virginia v. United States3 represents a
departure from the general rule that
constitutional challenges are not final
challenges for EPA purposes. Virginia
cites various cases which have found
that the circuit has jurisdiction over
review of final actions by the EPA. In
Palumbo v. Waste Technologies
Industries9 4, the court found that:
[W]hen Congress has chosen
to provide the circuit courts
with exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals from agency
decisions, the district courts
are without jurisdiction over
the legal issues pertaining to
those decisions--whether or
not those issues arise from the
statute that authorized the
agency action in the first
place.95
Pertaining to the instant case, the court
interpreted this to mean that the circuit
courts should have jurisdiction over
constitutional challenges because they
arise from the statute that authorized the
EPA's action."6 The claim in the
Palumbo case surrounded the validity
of hazardous waste permits issued by
the State and Federal EPA, not a
constitutional challenge to the statute
allowing the EPA to grant the hazardous
waste permits.97
The Virginia court also relied
heavily on the court in Greater Detroit
Resource Recovery Authority v. United
States Environmental Protection
Agency." That court suggested that no
matter how the grounds for review are
framed in a review of a final EPA action,
the channel for review is the federal
1916 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1990).
821d. at 321.
83ld.
"General Electric Management Corp. v. U.S., 764 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
8I5d. at 903.
'
61d. (quoting Denberg v. United States R. Retirement Board, 696 F.2d I193, 1197 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1706 (1984)).





'See Missouri v. United States, 918 F.Supp. 1320 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Pacific Legal Foundation v. Costle, 627 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1980).
974 F.3d 517.
9989 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1996).
"Id. at 161 (quoting Media Access Project v. FCC, 883 F.2d 1063,1067 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
'Commonwealth of Virginia, 74 F.3d at 523. That is what the court in Virginia is arguing.
97Id.
9"916 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1990).
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court of appeal." In that case, an action
was brought to determine whether or
not the EPA exceeded its power by
attempting to revoke a permit to build a
solid waste incinerator for a
municipality."" The court held that the
district courts had no jurisdiction over
cases arising under the Clean Air Act
pursuant to federal question jurisdiction
because Congress has granted
exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
courts of appeals.'o' The court in
Virginia interpreted this to mean that
even if a claim is framed as a
constitutional challenge, it is in effect a
challenge to an EPA decision and
should be brought in the federal courts
of appeal." 2 However, the court noted
that extreme circumstances could arise
which would justify an exception to the
statutorily prescribed means of
review." The court decided that the
exception did not apply because it
customarily applies only in extreme
circumstances of usurpation of power
by a federal agency.""'
Some courts have taken a
different approach than the Virginia
court did in determining whether
constitutional challenges fall under 42
U.S.C. Section 7607 as a "final action"
by the EPA. In Pacific Legal
Foundation v. Costle, the court held
that the district court did have
jurisdiction over a constitutional
challenge to a statute under the CAA."'
The plaintiffs in that case filed suit to
enjoin the defendants from enforcing a
ban on construction or modification of
air-pollution sources in California and
from punishing the state for failure to
comply with anti-pollution laws."' The
plaintiffs claimed that the EPA failed to
promulgate rules that would do away
with the need for the construction ban
and the EPA was using unconstitutional
funding sanctions to force the California
legislature to act." The court held that
the district court was without
jurisdiction to hear the claim regarding
the EPA's failure to promulgate
appropriate rules because that dealt with
a "final action" by the EPA which is
exclusively under the jurisdiction of the
circuit courts."' However, the court did
find that the constitutional challenge
was outside of 42 U.S.C. Section
7607(b)(1), the jurisdictional provision
which limits challenges to final actions
of the EPA to the federal courts of
appeal, in that it was not a final action
and was reviewable in the district courts
pursuant to federal question jurisdiction
of 28 U.S.C. Section 1331.""
D. Missouri v. United States"o
Another significant case which
decided that a constitutional challenge
was outside of 42 U.S.C. Section
7607(b)(1) is Missouri v. United
States."' This case, decided three days
after the instant case, followed Pacific
Legal Foundation's rationale." 2 The
facts mirror the facts in Virginia v.
United States."' Pursuant to the CAA
requirements that each state create an
SIP"4 in areas designated as serious,
severe, or extreme nonattainment zones,
the Governor declared the St. Louis
area"' to be an area of nonattainment
sufficient to warrant an SIP."6 In January
of 1993, the EPA notified Missouri of its
failure to submit certain elements of the
plan as required by the EPA."' Missouri
then modified the plan and resubmitted
it to the EPA."" The state failed to
implement an approved plan within the
statutorily allowed time."' Missouri
sought to enjoin the pending sanctions




102Virginia, 74 F.3d at 523.
""Greater Detroit, 916 F.2d at 323. The court is referring to the "Leedom Exception" which arises from Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184;
79 S.Ct. 180; 3 L.Ed.2d 210 (1958), where the Supreme Court decided that a "litigant may bypass available administrative procedures
where there is a readily observable usurpation of power not granted to the agency by Congress." The "Leedom Exception" would not
apply in the instant case because under 42 U.S.C. Sections 7410(m), 7506(c), & 7509(b)(1), Congress specifically grants to the EPA the
power to impose the challenged sanctions.
"Id.
"'Pacific Legal Foundation, 627 F.2d 917, 918 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 914 (1981).
I"6Id.
'""Id.
""Missouri v. United States, 918 F.Supp. 1320 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
"Id.
"
2 Id. at 1322
"'Virginia, 74 F.3d 5 17.
" 42 U.S.C. Sections 7409-10 (1989 & Supp. I. 1996).
"'This area consists of three counties in Illinois, four counties in Missouri, and the City of St. Louis.






claiming that the highway funds
sanctions of the CAA 20 violated the
spending clausel2' of the Constitution
as well as the Tenth Amendment.12 2 The
district court in Missouri held that it did
have subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim.'23 The court criticized the
decision in the instant case stating that
the authority cited by the Virginia court
was distinguishable because those
cases never addressed a constitutional
challenge.124 The Missouri court stated
that Virginia's interpretation of 42 U.S.C.
Section 7607 was too broad.' 25 The
court found that it had subject matter
jurisdiction over the federal question
addressed in Missouri's constitutional
challenge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1331.126 The Missouri court gave no
policy reasons for making this
distinction and refusing to follow the
Virginia decision other than the fact
that it could distinguish the authority
on which the Virginia court relied.'"
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Virginia v. United States, 21
the court began its analysis by
narrowing the issue to the question of
whether by framing its claim in a
constitutional vein, Virginia could
overcome the jurisdictional restrictions
imposed by the Clean Air Act, codified
in 42 U.S.C. Section 7607(b)(1).129 The
court looked first at whether a
constitutional claim could constitute a
"final action" under the relevant
jurisdictional statute.'30 The court
found that Virginia's constitutional
challenge to the validity of the highway
funds sanctions in effect sought to
invalidate a final EPA ruling."' To
determine Virginia's purpose in seeking
to declare the highway funds sanctions
of the in violation of the spending
clause,"' the commerce clause' and the
Tenth Amendment, 3 4 the court looked
at the petitioner's complaint.' The
court found that though the complaint
was not framed in such a way as to
challenge a final action by the EPA, the
practical objective of the constitutional
challenge was to nullify a final action
by the EPA.16 The court used various
cases which have interpreted "final
actions" very broadly in support of its
contention that a constitutional
challenge is a "final action".'
Virginia challenged the statute
on various grounds."' The state first
claimed that 42 U.S.C. Section 7607(b)(1)
should not restrict final action review
to the circuit courts.'3 9 The state argued
that the "exclusivity" of the circuit court
jurisdiction is undermined by the
"citizen suit" provision in 42 U.S.C.
Section 7604(a)(2) which gives the
district courts jurisdiction over claims
that the EPA Administrator failed to
perform a non-discretionary act or
duty."' Virginia argued that because
suits regarding some actions by the
Administrator of the EPA can be
brought in the district courts, Congress
did not intend that 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1)
be given "expansive reach". 4  The
court rejected this contention, citing
various cases that held that once circuit
courts obtain jurisdiction under Section
7607(b)(1), then the district courts lose
jurisdiction under the citizen suit
provision.142
Virginia also claimed that 42
U.S.C. Section 7604(e) which provides
12042 U.S.C. 7509(b)(1) (1996).
"U.S. Const., Art. I, Sect. 8 cl.l.
1




"6Id. 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 provides: The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.
"
7Id.




"'U.S. Const., Art. 1, Sect. 8, cl. 1.
'
3 3U.S. Const., Art. 1, Sect 8, cl. 3.
"U.S. Const. Amend X (1791).
1





"See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S.Ct. 771 (1994); Palumbo v. Waste Technologies, 989 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1993); Greater
Detroit Resource Recovery Authority v. United States EPA, 916 F.2d 317(6th Cir. 1990); Monongahela Power co. v. Reilly, 980 F.2d 272
(4th Cir. 1992); Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1992).
"'Virginia, 74 F3d at 523-26.
'
1 Id. at 523.
"'Id. at 524.




that nothing in Section 7604, the citizen
suit provision, "shall restrict any right
which any person ...may have under
any statute or common law to seek
enforcement.. .or to seek any other
relief..."I 43 indicates that Congress
intended to allow concurrent jurisdiction
over issues brought under Section
7607(b)(1), the jurisdictional provision
of the CAA.'" The court held that
Section 7604 simply meant that
Congress did not intend for the citizen
suit provision to preempt other available
remedies and the section in question did
not have any bearing on the
jurisdictional provisions of the CAA .145
In another argument by
Virginia, the state urged that the court
should not validate this statute because
it did not a way for petitioner's to obtain
"'meaningful judicial review" unless
there was a factual record obtained in
district court that could be re-examined
in the court of appeal.'" The current
procedure only allows for those facts
shown on the EPA record to be
examined in the courts of appeal.' 7 The
court rejected this argument, stating that
none of Virginia's claims required the
factual record for which Virginia
petitions.'"
Virginia further alleged that
withdrawal of highway funding violated
federalism-based limits on Congress'
spending power, showing the impact of
the sanctions on Virginia's economic
highway and construction programs.' 9
The court rejected this argument by
stating that the circuit courts could
always remand to the EPA and demand
spending information to be placed in the
administrative record. 5"
In its final claim, Virginia stated
that the jurisdictional restrictions under
42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) bound states in
such a way that could only be undone
byallowing concurrent jurisdiction in
district courts."' The court disagreed
with Virginia's contention, citing the
purpose behind the statute which is to
avoid "duplicative review" and the
"attendant delay and expense"
involved.'52 The court cited to various
authority which established the policy
reasons behind the statute and indicated
the bad effects of having concurrent
jurisdiction in the circuit courts as well
as the district courts.s 3 Because it
disagreed with the arguments made by
Virginia, the court decided to uphold the
"established meaning of [42 U.S.C.
7607(b)(1)]" and affirmed the district
court's decision.154
Counts I and II of Virginia's
claim challenged the NAAQS
provisions of the CAA on constitutional
grounds.' Virginia alleged that
Congress usurped its power in violation
of the Tenth Amendment by requiring
VOC reduction plans and I & M
programs for non-attainment areas in
addition to requiring broad access to
the state courts.' 6 Also, Virginia
suggested that the sanction provisions
of the CAA violate the Guarantee Clause
due to their coercive nature.'" The
court avoided these issues, stating that
a decision could be reached without
administrative fact finding.'
IV COMMENT
Virginia v. United States made
a bold move by declaring that a
constitutional challenge to the CAA
was, in effect, a final action by the EPA,
and thus under 42 U.S.C. Section
7607(b)(1), could only be reviewed in a
federal circuit court.' That other courts
like the one in Missouri v. United
States'(" might criticize it is no surprise.
Many cases have alluded to a very
broad interpretation of 42 U.S.C. Section
7607(b)(1), but the court in the Virginia
case is the first to extend the statutory
jurisdictional scheme to encompass
constitutional claims.'"' Clearly, the law
is unsettled in this area, indicated best
by the Missouri v. United States'6 2
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decision in Virginia v. United States'
just three days after that case was
decided in the federal circuit court.
The court in the Virginia case
stretched the rhetoric of vaguely similar
cases to establish exclusive jurisdiction
over constitutional claims in the courts
of appeal, regardless of the limited facts
and circumstances in each case. The
cases upon which the Virginia court
relied did not address constitutional
challenges, but EPA actions
themselves.'" In Palumbo v. Waste
Technologies Industries,"I the plaintiffs
challenged the granting of hazardous
waste permits by the EPA.'" The court
in that case indicated that jurisdiction
in such cases lies with the federal courts
of appeal, so long as the claim arose
from the statute authorizing agency
authority." The Virginia court applied
this dicta to the present case, stating
that a constitutional claim, which
necessarily arises from a statue, should
be brought in a federal circuit court as
well.'" The distinguishing fact that the
court in the Virginia case neglected to
address was that the court in Palumbo
was not faced with a constitutional
challenge."9 Virginia's interpretation is
very broad and its result might not be
the result intended by the court in
Palumbo.
Virginia also relies on Greater
Detroit Resource Recovery Authority
v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency.'" In Greater
Detroit, an action was brought in a
circuit court to challenge the EPA's
attempt to revoke a permit to build a solid
waste incinerator and steam generating
plant.'" The court in that case
suggested that no matter how the
grounds for review are framed, when
Congress has vested jurisdiction over
particular matters in the circuit courts,
the jurisdiction of those courts is
exclusive.' 72 The Virginia court
stretched this concept to its limit as well,
suggesting that even though the claim
was framed as a constitutional challenge
to the statute authorizing EPA action, it
should be brought in the circuit court
pursuant to the CAA's jurisdictional
provision.' Because of the wide-
reaching implications that a decision like
the one in Virginia raises, the court in
Greater Detroit might have decided
differently if faced with a constitutional
challenge.
It is difficult to justify such
broad interpretations of the Greater
Detroit and Palumbo cases. Not only
will there be confusion in courts about
constitutional claims and federal
question jurisdiction, but a decision like
this imposes huge costs on those
wanting to challenge the statute on
constitutional grounds. For example,
instead of simply bringing a claim to a
federal district court, the plaintiff must
bring it to a court of appeal which can
impose time limits for filing the claim.
Once filed, the court might prolong the
process by neglecting to make a
decision until a factual record is
established by the EPA.'74 In the mean
time, the state faces serious sanctions
such as withdrawal of highway funding
or federally imposed implementation
programs.-'s Also, by requiring that a
constitutional challenge be brought in
a federal court of appeal, the court
imposes a more stringent standard of
review on those bringing a claim in the
circuit courts.
Missouri v. United States"'
established a better rule of law than did
the court in Virginia. Those subject to
the Missouri decision can avoid many
of the problems raised by the Virginia
case. The Virginia decision undermines
a federal district court's jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331
which grants the district court
jurisdiction over federal questions."'
The court in Virginia seemed to
overlook this aspect of its decision.
There is probably no clearer case to be
brought in a district court pursuant to
federal question jurisdiction than
whether a statute violates the
constitution. The Missouri court got
this right by affirming the long-standing
rule that a constitutional challenge is a
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decision has unfairly limited the forum
in which a state can bring its claim,
causing many potential problems. In
effect, this could prevent a litigant from
getting a jury trial if there were any
relevant facts to be established, though
the court did indicate that the circuit
courts can allow the cases to be
remanded to the agency for factual
developments.1'9 To say that the circuit
court can always remand to the agency
for factual developments is an extremely
weak justification for not allowing the
case to be brought in the district courts
in the first place.' This justification
undermines the stated policy reasons
behind the jurisdictional provisions of
the CAA.'"' Judicial efficiency is hardly
achieved if a state has to bring a claim
in the circuit court which will have to be
remanded to the agency for factual
development which will have to go back
to the circuit court for a final decision.
The court in Missouri eliminates this
yo-yo scheme by allowing the case to
be brought in the district court for the
factual development and final
decision." 2 Only if there are grounds
for appeal will the case reach the circuit
courts. The Missouri approach seems
to be a better route to judicial efficiency
than the approach that the court in
Virginia took.
The court in Missouri also
makes a better decision than the court
in Virginia by allowing for a neutral
party, the district court, to be the fact-
finder, not the agency itself. It would
be naive to think that any entity whose
power is being threatened, no matter
how well-intentioned, would be
unbiased in deciding the facts of the
case. The Virginia court turns a blind
eye toward this issue, in effect giving
the EPA the power to decide the facts in
a case against itself.
In addition, the court in
Virginia neglected. to address what
would happen if a state brought a
constitutional challenge to the CAA
provisionsprior to a final determination
by the EPA.' In the instant case,
Virginia had been sanctioned and so the
court felt safe by categorizing the
constitutional challenge as an appeal to
the sanctions imposed by the EPA.'84
Virginia raised this issue, but the court
refused to address it, stating that "[tihe
dilemma that Virginia describes.. .is not
presented in this case.""' The court
limited its holding to cases where a final
decision by the EPA had been given.'
The state raised a valid point and by
failing to address it, the court weakened
its case. If the constitutional claim
challenging an environmental statute
can be brought in the federal district
courts under federal question
jurisdiction when no final EPA decision
has been reached, it seems untenable
that an EPA decision alone can divest
the federal district court of jurisdiction.
Conversely, if the constitutional
challenge cannot be brought at all
unless a final EPA decision has been
reached, Virginia might be motivated to
violate the EPA laws in order to have
standing to challenge the environmental
statute in the first place.'8 Should this
happen, the very purpose of the CAA
and its 1990 amendments would be
dishonored.
V. CONCLUSION
Missouri v. United States'
followed the majority view that a
constitutional challenge to an
environmental statue like the Clean Air
Act is separate from a final action by
the EPA. The decision in Virginia v.
United States'9 represents a departure
from this rule. The Virginia court
indicated that this would better support
the policy reasons behind the
jurisdictional scheme of the Clean Air
Act's "ambient air quality" provisions.
By stating that a constitutional
challenge is in effect a final decision by
the EPA, the Fourth Circuit is attempting
to promote quick and final judicial
review of environmental actions.
Though the stated purpose of
its decision was to promote
congressional intent by expediting the
review process of final agency actions,
the court in Virginia in no way fulfilled
that purpose. It complicated matters by
making constitutional challenges
equivalent to a final action by the EPA.
This decision brings uncertainty and
inconsistency into the process of
judicial review. It raises the question of
whether there will be review of
constitutional challenges when there is
no final action. It also conflicts with 28
U.S.C. Section 1331 which provides for
district court jurisdiction over federal
questions. In addition, it brings potential
bias and inefficiency to the judicial
process by determining that the EPA
itself can provide the factual record in a
case threatening its power.
The court in Missouri, on the
other hand, seems to have made a better
decision. The decision provides for an
efficient, unbiased procedure of review
consistent with the goals behind the
CAA and its amendments.
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